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vice Co. of Colorado. The dissent argued that the majority's analysis overlooked the crucial fact in that case: Public Service Company received more water than Colorado law would have otherwise granted. Contrary to the majority's
interpretation, the dissent argued that Public Service Co. of Colorado "stands
for the proposition that a downstream user cannot obtain a vested water right in
already appropriated water simply by applying that water to a beneficial, nonconsumptive use."
The dissent also questioned, among other things, what would happen if the
Frees changed the water diversion point. Because the potential answers proved
problematic, Justice Mirquez advised the Court to defer to the legislature on
"novel, out-of-piority diversions, rather than upholding a conditional water
right in the unique circumstances of this case and thereby establishing a potentially dangerous precedent."
Neilie Fields
McKenna v. Witte, 346 P.3d 35 (Colo. 2015) (holding that Division Engineer's statutory deadline to prepare a water rights abandonment list is a directional, not jurisdictional, mandate; and the water court did not erroneously determine abandonment of the water right).
In 1889, the Huerfano County District Court decreed three rights to water
from the Cucharas River ("Sanchez Ditch rights") to the Sanchez Ditch for crop
In 1991, Tom McKenna and McKenna Ranch (collectively
irrigation.
"McKenna") acquired the Sanchez Ditch rights with a tract of land at a foreclosure sale. In 2000, the local water commissioner warned McKenna's water attorney of the Sanchez Ditch's neglected state. In 2010, after the Sanchez Ditch
further deteriorated, the Division Engineer ("Engineer") placed the Sanchez
Ditch rights on the decennial abandonment list.
McKenna objected to the inclusion of the Sanchez Ditch rights on the abandonment list, claiming he used his Sanchez Ditch rights. The Engineer denied
McKenna's objection. McKenna protested the denial to the water court, and
he asked the water court to remove the Sanchez Ditch rights from the abandonment list. McKenna argued he (lid not abandon the Sanchez Ditch rights. He
testified to his use and repair of the Sanchez Ditch, proffered a 2003 receipt of
ditch maintenance, handwritten notes attesting to occasional use, and photographs depicting water in the Sanchez Ditch. McKenna also argued the water
court lacked jurisdiction to terminate his water rights because the Engineer
failed to compile the abandonment list before the statutory deadline. Conversely, the State argued that McKenna did not use the Sanchez Ditch rights for
decades, and failed to rebut the presumption of abandonment.
The water court found that the State's evidence triggered a presumption of
intent to abandon, and McKenna failed to subsequently rebut the presumption.
The water court rejected McKenna's statutory compliance argument because
the Engineer sufficiently complied with the statutory scheme by publishing the
list in July. McKenna appealed the water court's decision to the Colorado Supreme Court ("Court").
On appeal, the Court first reviewed de novo whether the abandonment list
preparation deadline was a directional or jurisdictional mandate. McKenna
contended that the mandatory language in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-9 2 -401(1)(a)
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("1969 Act") required strict compliance with the preparation deadline, and that
the Engineer did not meet this deadline. McKenna argued that the water court
lacked subject matterjurisdiction over tie abandonment determination because
the Engineer prepared the list on July 7, six days after the July I statutory deadline. The Court acknowledged that although the word "shall" in the 1969 Act
bore a mandatory connotation, whether a provision is mandatory or merely directory depends on legislative intent, rather than formalistic grammar. Moreover, the Court concluded that statutory provisions that establish time limits on
agency action were presumptively directory unless the statute reflected a contrary intent.
Employing these principles, the Court recognized that the legislature intended to vest the water court with broad discretion in order to protect the water
righls owners. Therefore, tie Court found that the preparation deadline at issue was not mandatory, so long as the error did not harm the water rights owner.
The Court reasoned that the Engineer's failure to meet the deadline did not
prejudice McKenna because the resulting delay did not prevent McKenna from
timely filing a protest to the abandonment list. Thus, because the Engineer's'
failure to comply with the deadline did not prejudice McKenna, and McKenna
subsequently invoked the water court's jurisdiction by filing the protest, the water court retained jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the Court held that
the applicable statutory deadline was a directional, not a jurisdictional, mandate.
The Court then reviewed the water court's abandonment determination for
clear error. The 1969 Act defines abandonment as "the termination of a water
right in whole or in part as the result of the intent of the owner thereof to discontinue permanently the use of all or part of the water available thereunder."
An owner's failure to apply a water right to a beneficial use for ten years triggers
a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon the water right. The burden
then shifts to tie water rights owner to rebut the abandonment presumption
with evidence that the owner did not intend to abandon the water right. If the
owner fails to produce sufficient evidence, then the failure to apply the water to
a beneficial use supports an abandonment determination.
The State argued that McKenna abandoned the Sanchez Ditch rights by
failing for decades to put the rights to beneficial use. The State supported this
contention with division records describing the Sanchez Ditch rights' neglected
condition. Additionally, the State offered testimony from the water cornnissioner supporting nonuse for decades, and testimony from the Engineer indicating McKenna never used the water available to the Sanchez Ditch for irrigation.
Conversely, McKenna tried to overcome the abandonment presumption
with evidence indicating that he consistently used the Sanchez Ditch for irrigation. Specifically, McKenna provided photographs showing that he flooded the
ditch for irrigation by damming the Cucharas River with a tire. McKenna's
neighbor, however, testified that McKenna flooded the ditch not for irrigation,
but to provide his attorney with photographs of water in the ditch.
The Court determined that McKenna's photographs did not evidence beneficial use because, as the water court had found, McKenna "choreographed"
the photographs to depict beneficial use that never occurred. Further, although
McKenna's evidence showed that he wanted to keep his water rights, his evidence did not show that he intended to beneficially use his water rights. Thus,
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the Court held McKenna did not rebut the abandonment presumption.
Accordingly, the Court held that the abandonment list preparation deadline
was a directional and not a jurisdictional mandate, aflirmed the water court's
finding of abandonment, and remanded to the water court for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.

Daphne Harmilton
St.Jude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, LLC, 351 P.3d 442 (Colo. 2015) (holding that (i) the private club's asserted "aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial
uses," without impoundment, do not meet the state's constitutional and statutory requirements for beneficial use, and therefore, the water court erred in
granting new appropriative rights to the club; and (ii) the water court correctly
determined that prior agreements between the parties barred all but one of the
claims against the private club).
Roaring Fork Club ("the Club") owns a private resort along the Roaring
Fork River that provides members and guests with golfing, fishing, residential,
and recreational amenities. The resort is located upstream from a contiguous
parcel where St. Jude's Company ("the Company") conducts agricultural operations. The two parties have water rights that are diverted from the same headgate located on the Club's property. A settlement agreement and a mutual release agreement ("the Prior Agreements"), which are the result of earlier
litigation between the parties, govern the terms of the parties' water use.
In March of 2007, the Club filed two applications with the Garfield County
District Court, Water Division 5 ("the water court"). The first application requested a decree of new appropiative water rights and a change in the point of
diversion of an existing water right. The Club sought new appropriative rights
for "aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial uses" because it claimed that since
2001 it had diverted 21 cubic feet per second from the Roaring Fork River ("the
River") into its ditch. The Club also sought to correct the legal description of
an existing right's point of diversion to its actual location. The second application proposed an augmentation plan for the ditch to account for "evaporative
depletions."
The Company opposed both of the Club's applications because the Company was concerned that those changes would adversely affect its downstream
rights. In October of 2007, the Company also filed a complaint against the Club
with the water court. The Company alleged that the Club was wrongfully denying it access to and use of the headgate on Club's property in violation of the
Prior Agreements and Colorado law. The Company also alleged trespass and
breach of contract, and requested that the water court quiet title to two other
disputed priority rights between the parties.
The water court approved both of the Club's applications. It decreed the
Club new appropriative rights "for aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial uses,"
corrected the legal description of the diversion point, and approved the proposed augmentation. The water court found that the terms of the Prior Agreements between the two parties barred all of the Company's claims, aside from
one. The water court quieted tide to the disputed priority rights, allotting sixtyone percent of each right to the Company and thirty-nine percent to the Club.
The Company appealed the water court's ruling to the Colorado Supreme

